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FOREWORD
In 1985 the University of Zimbabwe and Michigan State University initiated a Food 
Security Research Network for Southern Africa. The objectives of the network are 
to conduct research that informs policymakers about food security issues and to help 
strengthen the regional capacity for food policy analyis. The underlying premise of 
the network is that building excellence in research capacity for national policy 
analysis comes through experience. In practice, this requires a long-term 
commitment to analytical capacity building, consistency in funding, and constant 
interaction between researchers and policymakers.
The network has sponsored four annual conferences for network researchers, 
policymakers, SADCC officials, and representative of international and donor 
agendes. The aim of the conference is to share research findings, identify new 
research themes, and provide an opportunity for policy dialogue between regional 
researchers, policymakers, and government officials.
The 1988 conference brought together 110 participants who deliberated on 28 
papers. In the Official Opening, Vice-Chancellor W J. Kamba of the Univesity of 
Zimbbawe highlighted the importance of including health related-issues as a 
component of food security; and Zimbabwe’s Senior Minister of Finance, Economic 
Planning, and Development B.T.G. Chidzero outlined policy reform priorities for 
Southern Africa. Subsequent sessions focused on SADCC’s Food Security 
Programme, the Impact o f Market Reform on Food Security, Food Security Policy 
Options, New Technology to Improve Food Security, Family Food Security Options in 
Low-Rainfall Areas, Expanding Agricultural Trade in the SADCC Region, Nutrition and 
Food Security, the Contribution o f Small-Scale Rural Enterprises to Employment 
Generation and Food Security, and the Impact o f Irrigation on Food Security.
A highlight of the 1988 conference was the participation of five nutritionists from 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sweden, and the United States. The presence of the 
nutritionists stimulated formal and informal discussions on the food access side of 
the food security equation and drew attention to the need to initiate more research 
in this area.
A second highlight of the 198s conference was the attention given to reducing 
barriers to expanded intraregional trade in the SADCC region. Results presented 
suggest that there appear to be substantial price and nonprice barriers to expanded 
trade. Nevertheless, there exist significant opportunities for expanding intraregional 
trade that can be realized through appropriate government initiatives.
This proceeding contains revised papers prepared under the sponsorship of the 
University of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University Food Security Research Project 
in Southern Africa and presented at the University of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Annual 
Conference on Food Security Research in Southern Africa, held at the Holiday Inn, 
Harare, October 31-November 3, 1988.
Godfrey Mudimu and Richard H. Bernsten 
Co-Directors
UZ/M SU Food Security Research Project 
University of Zimbabwe
EXCHANGE RATE OVERVALUATION AND 
AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE IN 
ZIMBABWE: 1965-1985
Kuphukile Mlambo1
INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and early 1970s, most African countries followed relatively passive 
exchange rate policies. This was the period when the Bretton Wood System was still 
in force, and the relative price (exchange rate) stability prevailed in both developed 
and developing countries. However, in 1972 the Bretton Wood System broke down 
and a number of developed countries adopted floating exchange rate systems. Most 
African countries opted not to float their currencies, but instead preferred to peg 
their currencies to a single currency (e.g., the US dollar) or to a basket of currencies.
With the benefit of hindsight, this appears to have been a mistake, because 
confronted with the oil crisis, increased inflation, and falling terms of trade, for many 
countries the exchange rate became overvalued. Prices were slowly getting out of 
line and export competitiveness was being lost. In the 1970s, no one was alarmed 
because any disequilibrium in balance of payments was covered by capital inflows 
from abroad.
In the 1980s all this changed. First, the debt crisis exploded; then capital inflows 
declined to a trickle; while export earnings continued to decline as developed 
countries became more protectionist and, in general, the capitalist world experienced 
a deep-seated recession. At the same time, the disequilibrium in the exchange rate 
became unsustainable, foreign exchange shortage became a fact of life, and in some 
countries a parallel market for foreign exchange developed. Clearly something had 
to be done, and there appears to have been a rush towards a much more active use 
of the exchange rate. This rush has been of three types:
o Some countries, such as Malawi, have retained a fixed exchange regime, but 
also uses discrete devaluations to reduce overvaluation, 
o Some countries, such as Tanzania, have retained a fixed exchange rate system, 
but also moved to a crawling peg.
o Some countries, like Zambia and Uganda, opted for a market-determined 
exchange rate system (e.g., foreign exchange auctions).
These exchange rate adjustments policies are designed to achieve three things: 
o to correct balance of payments disequilibrium (more specifically to deal with 
the current account deficits);
o to restore international export competitiveness caused by decades of currency 
overvaluation; and
o to switch expenditure away from the tradeable goods sector.
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However, after more than half a decade of exchange rate adjustment, it is still 
unclear whether these policies have achieved what they were intended to do. At the 
same time, the discussion has shifted away from the macro level, to study the impact 
of exchange rate adjustment (or failure to adjust) on inter- and intra-sectoral 
performance and resource allocation. The International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) has carried out several studies to investigate the effects of exchange 
rate policies on agriculture. Valdes and Pinckney (1986) argued that the exchange 
rate is the most influential price affecting incentives for agriculture. This argument 
was endorsed by the World Bank in 1981 when it declared that trade and exchange 
rate policies were at the heart of the failure of most African countries to provide 
adequate incentives for agricultural production and for exports.
The relationship between exchange rate policy and agricultural production is easy 
to comprehend. Exchange rate adjustment is designed to change the domestic 
relative prices of tradeables and nontradeables to increase the profitability of 
producing tradeables. Since the largest contributor to the tradeable goods sectors 
is agriculture in most developing countries, a policy that affects the profitability of 
tradeable goods production similarly affects the profitability of agricultural activities.
In the last half of the 1980s, another dimension was added to the debate, the so- 
called cash crops debate (Maxwell, 1988). It was argued that while exchange rate 
adjustment may have favoured agricultural export production, it may have dire 
consequences for food security. If the connection between exchange rate policy and 
agricultural production is not easy to see, the connection between exchange rate and 
food security is even more clouded.
In this study, food security is considered as having two aspects: the basic cause 
(or aspect) of food security; and the secondary aspect (Eicher and Rukuni, 1986). 
The basic cause of food security is related to an income problem-people are food 
insecure because of reduced access to an adequate diet of food at all times. The 
secondary aspect of food security is related to food availability—people suffer from 
food insecurity because a country is unable to provide its citizens with an adequate 
diet from domestic production or is unable to increase food imports to meet its food 
consumption needs.
Exchange rate policy will impact on both aspects of food security. A policy that 
maintains an overvalued exchange rate would reduce the incentive to produce food 
crops- (as food imports come in ) and this will lead to a reduction in the returns to 
farmers. Since the majority of the fanners in developing countries are peasants who 
are net consumers, as opposed to net producers, an overvalued exchange rate would 
worsen their food security situation. It would appear that policies that turn the 
terms of trade against agriculture are detrimental to food security, since they worsen 
income and kill incentives to produce. Above all, for most developing countries, 
poor agricultural performance means poor overall economic growth rates. And 
unless a country is growing, it cannot guarantee an improvement in incomes, and 
therefore food security.
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AGRICULTURE IN CONTEXT
In analyzing the impact of policy on agriculture in Zimbabwe, bear in mind that 
agriculture forms the backbone of the economy. Available data shows that in times 
of agricultural buoyancy, the economy is also buoyant, and vice versa. The years 
1980 and 1981 were good agricultural seasons and real gross domestic product 
(GDP) grew at 11% and 10.7%, respectively. After these two good years, a three- 
year drought followed, during which GDP actually declined, falling as low as -4% in 
1983.
« Despite its importance in the economy, agriculture’s performance has been 
unimpressive. Despite remaining the second larger contributor to GDP, its share has 
been declining (Table 1). Between 1970-74, agriculture’s share of GDP was 16.8%, 
but by 1982-83, it declined to 12.1%. In contrast, manufacturing increased its share 
from 22.7% in 1970-74 to over 25% in 1982-83. The table also shows that since the 
1970-74 period, agricultural employment has been growing at a negative rate, while 
the agricultural share of total wage employment has been declining. Valdes and 
Pickney (1986) hypothesized that such a shift of labour from agriculture is "one of 
the most dramatic manifestations of the strong bias against agriculture resulting from 
trade and exchange policies”. While this statement may appear a generalization and 
other factors exist to explain this phenomenon, it is possible to argue that during the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965-79), the development strategy tended 
to favour the manufacturing sector; and thus, encouraged resources to flow to this 
sector. Table 1 shows that this may have been the case, since the share of wage
Table 1. Selected sectoral indicators, Zimbabwe, 1965 to 1984 (percent).
Indicator 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1980-81 1982-83
Increase in ag. 
employment* 0.2 4.1 2.1 4.5 8.4 0.8
Ag employment share 
of total employment* 37.5 35.3 34.4 27.3 30.4 24.9
Mfg. employment share of 
total employment* 11.6 13.8 14.6 16.5 16.3 17.1
Ag. exports share of 
total exportsb na na 21.8C 283 26.8 30.7
Food exports share of 
ag. exports na na 76.5d 45.0 32.9 43.7
Ag. output as share of 
GDP* na 16.8 15.9 13.1 14.9 12.1
Source: ‘Calculated from Zimbabwe (various issues). bCalculated from Zimbabwe (1986). cOnly the 
years 1977-79 are included. dOnly the years 1978-79 are included, na = data not available.
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employment in manufacturing to total wage employment increased over the same 
period.
However, to argue that industry has been protected at the expense of agriculture 
may be an over simplification, since from the 1930s, the state has canvassed policies 
designed to protect commercial agriculture. For example, in 1931 the Maize Control 
Board was set up to guarantee white settler farmers high domestic producer prices, 
high enough to compensate them for low export prices. At independence the 
government increased the producer price of maize by 41% and unproved the access 
of peasant farmers to institutional credit in a bid to improve their productivity.
In the case of agricultural exports, total agricultural exports as a share of total 
exports have been increasing since the 1970s, while food exports have been falling 
(Table 1). These trends explain why, for Zimbabwe food self-sufficiency (as opposed 
to food security) is not yet an issue, although agricultural production, between 1965- 
80, grew at about 2% per annum, compared to an annual population growth rate of 
3.5% (Green, 1986). A possible food supply crisis appears to have been avoided by 
a shift in the balance of food/export production. Government has maintained this 
policy after 1980, where maize exports are only permitted after domestic food 
requirements have been satisfied. Zimbabwe’s major food exports are maize and 
beef.
Food imports do not constitute a significant proportion of the total import bill. 
In fact, in some official statistics food imports do not even appear, giving the 
impression that the gap between domestic food production and food demand is 
narrower. However, over the years, food imports have been increasing. For maize 
and other food crops, this is due to weather variability. For example in 1984, it was 
necessary to import 269,000 mt of maize following a three-year drought.
Food self-sufficiency is still not yet a problem for Zimbabwe, or as Green (1986) 
puts it, "the food constraint has been somewhat relaxed, or at least postponed, in 
itself a notable achievement and one demonstrating that political economic priority 
shifts towards egalitarianism can have distinct positive results" (p.19). However, this 
does not mean that food security at a national, or even regional level (since for 
SADCC, Zimbabwe was chosen to coordinate food security) is not going to be a 
problem. In fact, one observes here a paradox. Here we have a nation that, in good 
agricultural season, produces surplus food, and as a result maintains a huge and 
expensive food (grain) stock. Yet, its neighbours are importing food. Such a 
paradox can only be tackled at a policy and political level, and it appears that 
exchange rate adjustment could be one such policy.
POLICY ENVIRONMENT 1965-1985
UDI: 1965-1979
After Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence from Britain in 1965, the 
United Nations, at the instigation of Britain, imposed trade sanctions, and a shortfall 
in foreign exchange emerged. In a bid to maintain production, the regime in power 
instituted an import substitution industrialization strategy, a strategy that requires 
protectionist policies to succeed. As a result, the UDI period witnessed the
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development of a tightly controlled economic system with administrative allocations 
of foreign currency, price controls, and investment regulations. According to 
Mabhena (1988), these three instruments formed the main pillars of economic policy 
during UDI.
Foreign exchange allocation
The system for allocating foreign currency was (and has remained) central to the 
management of the economy. The actual allocation is largely based on the 
machinery designed in 1965. As a result, some observers argue that the procedures 
tended to favour those industries in operation at the time. However, the system did 
more than just maintain equilibrium in the external accounts or conserve scarce 
foreign currency-it actually provided sufficient protection for domestic industrial 
producers. As a result, both the exchange rate and custom duties (trade policy) did 
not play an important role.
Price controls
Price controls were instituted to keep the basic consumables within reach of the 
people. This was especially so in the case of basic food stuffs like mealie-meal and 
bread. For example, the selling price of maize remained Z$4.17/mt between 1965 
and 1974, while the producer price of Grade A maize increased from Z$34.00 to Z$ 
36.37/mt over the same period. There was therefore a deliberate policy to keep the 
basic prices of basic food stuffs at affordable levels, while setting producer prices 
high enough to guarantee food availability.
Investment policy
The investment control policy was also limited to the foreign exchange allocation 
system in that investment control was instituted to save scarce foreign currency. 
These controls required that all new investment should save or earn (net) foreign 
exchange, thus providing further protection to domestic firms. Clearly then, UDI 
provides an example of instances where controls can work very well.
Assessment of the strategy
The strategy appears to have been successful during the early years of UDI (i.e., up 
to 1974). Between 1965 to 1974, GDP grew at an annual average rate of above 7% 
and employment grew at above 3% per annum, while the rate of growth of gross 
fixed capital formation was 22%. Table 2 shows that Rhodesia managed to maintain 
a positive balance of trade, and this positive balance increased as a proportion of 
total exports. At the inception of UDI, imports as a share of national income stood 
at 45%. By the end of UDI (1980), imports had fallen to 36% of national income. 
In 1965, imports had fallen to 36% of national income. In 1965, exports were 55% 
of national income. However, they fell to 37% the following year, and by the end 
of UDI they were down to 32% of national income. Adding together the ratios of 
exports and imports to national income provides a basic measure of the degree of 
openness of the economy (Robinson, 1987). As shown on Table 3, at UDI 
Rhodesia’s indicator of openness was 102%. In the following year it fell to 71%, and
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Table 2. Indicators of international trade, Zimbabwe, 1970 to 1985.
Exports Imports Balance of 
trade
Balance on 
current a/c
Balance of 
trade as %
Current 
account as % 
of exports
Million Zimbabwe dollars
1970 258.7 235.0 23.8 na 9.2 na
1971 290.2 282.5 7.8 na 2.7 na
1972 349.1 274.7 74.4 na 21.3 na
1973 389.1 308.6 80.5 2.6 20.7 na
1974 531.2 438.3 92.8 95.5 17.5 na
1975 531.3 461.9 69.4 106.7 13.1 20.0
1976 557.4 382.7 174.7 9.9 31.3 1.8
1977 550.8 388.1 162.7 19.7 29.5 3.6
1978 609.3 403.7 205.6 13.4 33.7 7.2
1979 715.7 549.3 166.4 73.9 23.2 10.3
1980 909.2 809.4 99.8 156.7 11.0 17.2
1981 971.7 1,017.7 46.0 43.6 4.7 A5
1982 968.4 1,081.8 113.4 532.9 11.7 55.0
1983 1,150.2 1,061.6 88.6 454.2 7.7 39.5
1984 1,453.0 1,200.7 252.3 101.9 17.4 7.0
1985 1,795.5 1,446.5 349.0 159.2 19.4 8.7
na = data not available
Source: Compiled from CSO (various issues).
Table 3. Exports and imports as a proportion of national income, Zimbabwe, 
1965 to 1984.
Year Exports Imports Exports + Imports
1965 55 47 102
1966 37 34 71
1975 31 32 63
1980 32 36 68
1981 28 36 64
1982 25 31 56
1983 26 30 56
1984 30 30 60
Source: Robinson (1987)
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by 1980 this indicator was down to 68%, reflecting the development of a tightly- 
controlled economic policy environment.
However, after 1974 things started going wrong, as shown by Kadhani and Green 
(1985) and Green’s (1986) analysis of the current account deficit (CAD) during this 
period. After 1974, several factors—like oil price increases, the international 
recession, the intensification of the liberation war, the effect of economic sanctions, 
the overheating of the domestic economy, and a highly import intensive expansion 
of gross fixed capital formation-rendered the CAD unsustainable. According to 
Green, the "domestic response was in a sense, an ultra orthodox demand-cutting 
strategy, albeit centered on achieving a visible trade surplus and balance on current 
account, rather than on domestic demand management per se, and on eschewing use 
of active interest on exchange rate policies" (p.21).
Thus, even when the development strategy began to run into a crisis, there was 
little change in the policy stance of the regime. By the end of UDI, there were signs 
that urgent change was necessary.
Post-independence: continuity in change
The post-independence government has effectively left intact the system of economic 
controls, but with some modification. In the immediate post-independence period, 
the government canvassed a strategy that promoted growth with equity. Growth was 
to be promoted by a dramatic increase in foreign exchange allocation. In the first 
two years of independence, this appears to have been achieved, as the economy 
experienced an impressed growth rate of 14%. In agriculture, the government also 
increased producer prices as follows: maize (40%); wheat (17%); soyabeans (5%); 
sorghum (31%), and groundnuts (8%). The government also incorporated the 
peasant sector into the cash economy k>y making subsidized credit available to them. 
Equity was to be achieved by expanding such social services as health and education, 
implementing the resettlement programme, and increasing minimum wages.
Approaching crisis
Towards the end of 1981, the strategy ran into a crisis, due to increased external 
imbalances, the drought, the international recession, and increased domestic 
inflation. To deal with these problems, the government introduced a radical 
programme of external adjustment, including foreign exchange allocation. However, 
this instrument was complemented by a devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar and 
movement to a more flexible, albeit, managed exchange rate policy. At the same 
time, the government allowed the prices of basic food stuffs and other basic utilities 
to increase. The selling price of maize rose from Z$89 to Z$137/mt in 1982, while 
that of wheat rose from Z$109.85/mt in 1982 to Z$139.00/mt in 1983. Wage control 
was also introduced as an anti-inflation device.
There was, however, the paradox that, in spite of these "radical" policy measures, 
there was little control on the government budget deficit. While the current account 
deficit, as a proportion of GDP fell from 12.3% in 1981 to 4.1% in 1985, the budget 
deficit, as a share of GDP, increased from 9.4% to 18.3% over the same period.
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The increase in the budget was due to increases in subsidies paid to parastatals and 
expenditures on defence, education, and health.
First five-vear development plan
In 1986, the government published the country’s First Five Year National Development 
Plan (1986-90) which contained government’s policy intentions for the coming five 
years. The government planned to increase investment in the productive spheres of 
the economy (agriculture, manufacturing, and mining). Second, the government 
committed itself to reducing the budget deficit, and third, it adopted a policy of 
export promotion.
At the same time, the government has committed itself to gradual trade 
liberalization. To achieve this, the government has instituted a trade liberalization 
study which is expected to spell out the pace and areas of trade liberalization. This 
trade liberalization study is expected to form an input into an overall adjustment 
programme intended to achieve sustained growth in the Zimbabwean economy.
THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE (1965-1985)
It has been stated above that the policy environment during UDI became essentially 
interventionist and restrictionist, and any adjustment in the external account was 
achieved through administrative allocation of foreign currency. This section, analyses 
the impact of such a policy environment on the international competitiveness of the 
country’s goods and incentives to produce tradeables.
Categories of exchange rates
According to Valdes and Pinckeney (1986), there are two categories of exchange 
rates: the nominal exchange rate (NER) and the real exchange rate (RER). They 
define the NER as an undeflated conversion factor between one currency and 
another; and the RER as a measure of the terms of trade between the traded and 
the nontraded goods in the economy. In this study, we have adopted the World 
Bank approach to exchange rate calculations. The World Bank calculates the 
exchange rate as "an index of relative domestic and world prices expressed in terms 
of a common currency (World Bank, 1987, p.101). In other words:
Where:
R (Pad (Eo)
Pf
R = Real exchange rate
Eo = Nominal exchange rate
Pq = Index of the price of home goods
Pf = Index of foreign prices.
As the World Bank mentions, defining R this way has certain advantages, in that 
if R is increasing, then clearly, the home currency is appreciating, and vice versa.
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However, defining the real exchange rate this way raises two problems—one of 
measurement and the other of meaning. The measurement problem comes in when 
one wants to talk about the price index of home goods. Others have suggested that 
the price of home goods can be proxied by the GDP deflator, while others prefer to 
use the wage rate index. The use of the GDP deflator is problematic in the sense 
that tradeables are included in the index. Using the wage rate as the deflator 
"automatically makes the real exchange rate connote a real wage rate index" 
(Durnbush and Helmers, 1988, p .ll). Besides, these problems of defining the 
appropriate price index for nontradeables, there are also "weighing problems in 
constructing an index of foreign prices" (World Bank, 1987, p.101). In this study, 
foreign prices were defined as the average of index prices of exports and imports in 
foreign currency, while four variables were used to proxy the price index of home 
goods. These were the building material price index; the food stuffs component in 
the consumer price index; and the average consumer price index for higher and 
lower income urban families.
The second problem with the way the real exchange rate is defined, is just what 
are we trying to show by the index. This is because as an index, the real exchange 
rate says nothing about whether the currency is over or undervalued. It only tells 
us how the exchange rate is fluctuating around a certain base period. Thus, what we 
are assuming is that a particular rate in the past was the correct one, celeries paribus; 
and therefore, it becomes a basis for a target.
Trends in the real exchange rate
In this study, 1980 has been chosen as the basic period. It appears reasonable to do 
this because some authors like green and Kadhani (1985) have argued that in 1980, 
there was some relaxation in the economy. Moreover, foreign exchange allocation 
was increased and almost every sector was booming. Thus, while this study does not 
answer the question of whether the Z$ is overvalued or not, it does show how its 
value has been moving since 1980 and before.
Figure 1 shows the trends in Zimbabwe’s real exchange rate against the US dollar 
and the SDR from 1965 to 1985. The table shows that, up to 1970, the real exchange 
rate was relatively stable, but after this period it began to appreciate. In the early 
1970s, there were a number of debates as to whether or not the Rhodesian dollar 
(R$) was overvalued and therefore should be devalued, especially after the 
devaluations of the South African Rand the US$ (Girdlestone, 1973). Those 
producing exportables, like farmers and miners, favoured devaluation while the 
manufacturing sector was against devaluation. Girdlestone, talking for the majority 
of the protected manufacturing sector, argued against devaluation, as this would 
foster GDP disequilibrium rather than correct it. However, after this period, the 
real exchange rate stabilized again, up to the time of independence.
At independence, there was a slight appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
However, in 1982 the government devalued the Z$ by 20%. At the same time, the 
exchange rate went onto a managed float, and thus over the years had depreciated 
substantially. It is difficult to tell whether this depreciation has been enough due to 
the difficulty of calculating the degree of overvaluation. Although the excess demand
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Figure 1. Zimbabwe real exchange rate, 1965 to 1986.
for foreign exchange that exists indicates that he Z$ may still be overvalued; a 
sounder conclusions would be that the system of foreign exchange allocation has 
made it possible for Zimbabwe to support an exchange rate at which there is still 
excess demand for foreign currency.
Relative price trends for home goods and tradeables
Table 4 shows the trends in the relative prices in the economy. Up to about 1980, 
these prices have tended to remain closer to the prices of home goods. This is one 
of the interesting developments of the UDI period-even though the country 
canvassed a protection and interventionist policy environment, the authorities did 
not allow this to prejudice the price of tradeables. As a result, they allowed the 
exchange rate to depreciate and did not impose a tax on exports. After 
independence, the gap between the price of tradeables and certain agricultural 
exports, on one hand, and the price of home goods has widened. For example, in 
the case of the relative-price of tradeables, the ratio fell from 101.9% tin 1979 to 
72% in 1982 and 42% in 1983. This implies that the incentives to produce for 
tradeables have been declining, and in the case of agriculture, growth has been lower 
than it should be. The gap also reflects the impact of protectionist commercial 
policies.
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Table 4. Domestic relative prices and the real exchange rate, Zimbabwe, 
1965 to 1985.
Relative price of Relative price of Relative price of Real exch.
exports imports tradeables rate
Year Index3 Charge (%) Index3 Charge (%) Index3 Charge (%) Index*3
1965 1.39 0.0 0.96 0.0 1.18 0.0 0.662
1966 1.22 12.8 1.01 5.8 1.12 -5.2 0.699
1967 1.15 5.6 0.99 2.8 1.07 -4.4 0.731
1968 1.14 0.7 0.94 4.1 1.04 -2.3 0.747
1969 1.17 2.5 0.93 1.9 1.05 03 0.744
1970 1.25 6.7 0.93 0.4 1.09 3.6 0.843
1971 1.13 9.0 0.96 2.8 1.05 -33 0.843
1972 0.81 28.6 0.91 5.4 0.86 -18.0 1.089
1973 1.13 39.2 0.87 2.4 1.01 17.2 1.075
1974 1.27 12.6 1.04 15.3 1.15 14.6 1.145
1976 1.12 53 1.03 2.6 1.07 -1.8 0.966
1977 1.00 10.8 0.97 5.4 0.99 -8.2 0.964
1978 0.95 5.1 0.99 1.3 0.97 -1.9 0.902
1979 0.91 4.0 1.13 14.3 1.02 5.4 0.858
1980 1.00 9.7 1.00 11.3 1.00 -83 1.000
1981 0.88 11.8 0.79 20.6 0.84 -16.2 0.923
1982 0.88 0.1 0.70 12.2 0.73 -13.4 0.648
1983 0.88 0.4 0.70 0.5 1.72 -1.4 0.455
1984 0.85 3.9 0.70 0.0 0.77 8.1 0.228
1985 0.85 0.6 0.69 1.7 0.77 -0.4 0.209
*Data rounded to two decimal places. bData rounded to three decimal places. 
Source: Compiled from CSO (various issues).
THE INCIDENCE OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE  
RATE POLICIES
In this section, the impact of trade and exchange rate policies on the level and 
structure of incentives in the economy is calculated. To do this, a model developed 
by Dornbush (1974) and Sjaastad (1980) and extensively utilized in many 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) studies is also used here. 
This is a model of an open economy consisting of three sectors producing 
exportables, importables, and nontraded goods; and derives the equilibrium price 
relationships among the three (Dyejide, 1986; Bautista, 1987).
The model
The regression equation of the model is:
log Ph = 
Px
a + Win (Pm) 
(Px)
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Where Ph = price index for nontradeables 
Px = price index for exportables 
Pm = price index for importables.
In this equation, the interpretation of W, referred to as the incidence parameter, 
is very important. According to Dyejide, W measures the combined effects of trade 
and exchange rate policies on relative price changes of the three sectors. A high W 
means a country’s nontradeable goods and importables are close substitutes. Thus, 
an increase in the relative price of importables to exportables, due to trade and 
exchange rate policies, would lead to a composite increase in the relative price of 
nontradeables to exportables. As a result, production for exportables would become 
unattractive. Since agriculture is the major contributor to the production of 
exportables, it would absorb most of the burden.
Empirical results
For Zimbabwe, the regression results are shown on Tables 5 and 6. Two variables 
have been added to the equation since time-series data has been used in the 
estimation. The Cochrane-Orcutt method was used to correct for first order serial 
correlation. For all the equations run, the W coefficient was significant, and the R2 
was also reasonable.
Table 5. Regression results for total exports, Zimbabwe, 1965 to 1985.
Independent variables Dependent variables
Log Phi 
Px
Log Ph2
Px
Log Ph3 
Px
Log Ph4 
Px
Constant 0.9000
(2.7168)
-2.6053
(4.1115)
1.8677
(2.4951)
1.1413
(2.4324)
Log (Pm/Px) 0.7980
(0.1425)
0.7857
(0.2777)
0.9952
(0.1701)
0.8667
(0.1559)
Log GDP -0.0284
(0.3007)
0.3686
(0.5005)
-0.1920
(0.3039)
-0.1050
(0.2950)
Log BOT -0.0121
0.1165
-0.0099
(0.0215)
0.0044
(0.0013)
- 0.0011
(0.0121)
R2 0.6560 0.3209 0.6132 0.6713
DW 1.5370 1.4530 1.4708 1.4292
P 0.9558 0.8024 0.7987 0.8250
Phi = building material price index; Ph2 = component of domestic workers wages in CPI; Ph3 = food 
component of CPI; Ph4 = average CPI. The figures in parentheses are the standard errors.
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Results displayed on Table 5 show that for total exports, W is between 0.78 and 
0.87. This means that for Zimbabwe, importable goods and nontradeable goods are 
fairly close substitutes. As a result, we expect that if the relative price of importables 
increases by 1%, then the relative price of importables increases by 1%, then the 
relative price of nontradeables to exportables would increase by between 0.78% and 
0.87%. Therefore, this result partly explains Table 4 which shows that over time 
the relative prices of exports have declined under an import substitution 
industialisation regime supported by such controls as the foreign exchange allocation 
system, price controls, and investment controls. A fall in the relative prices of 
tradeables to those of nontradeables, implies a diversion of resources to production 
for the home market. Therefore, Zimbabwe’s trade and exchange rate policies partly 
explain the performance of agriculture and the consequent decline in employment 
levels in the sector.
Due to the difficulties of getting time-series data on the price of agricultural 
exports, it was impossible to calculate the impact of trade and exchange rate policies 
on the agricultural sectors as a whole. However, estimation on certain agricultural 
export-three of which are classified as food exports (maize, beef, and coffee) and 
two cash crops (tobacco and cotton)-was carried out. The overall import price 
index was used, since none of these goods are normally imported into Zimbabwe. 
For all the equations, the W coefficient was significant at the 5% level of confidence, 
and the R2 was to be quite high (see Table 6).
Table 6. Regression results for agricultural commodities, Zimbabwe.
Dependent variable
Independent variable Coffee Beef Maize Cotton Tobacco
Log Phi Log Phi Log Ph2 Log Phi Log Phi
Px coffee Px Beef Px Maize Px Cottoni Px Tobaooo
Constant -11.4340 -8.8859 0.4138 -11.7610 -8.3647
(1.7285) (1.8519) (3.8198) (1.5177) (1.9232)
Log Pm/Pxl 0.8335 0.8838 0.9673 0.9019 0.7087
(0.1094) (0.0507) (0.0906) (0.1619) 0.1205)
Log GDP 1.5152 1.1636 -0.0186 1.4068 1.0256
(0.2247) (0.2132) 0.4631 (0.1855) (0.2395)
R2 0.9463 0.9722 0.9366 0.9090 0.7903
DW 1.9260 1.6564 1.1702 1.7842 1.6920
Phi = building material price index; Pxl = the export price index of agricultural commodity 1; Ph2 
= food component of the low income consumer price index. The figures in parenthesis are the 
standard errors.
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For all the crops under discussion, the incidence parameter is quite high, between 
0.7 and 0.9. The most surprising result is for maize, with an incidence parameter of 
0.9. Strictly speaking, for Zimbabwe maize is not really a tradeable good as it is 
exported only after the domestic market has been satisfied. Moreover, maize has 
historically been given a higher domestic price compared to the export price. These 
results show that maize production is sensitive to policy charges. Since the majority 
of the peasants are involved in maize production, an exchange rate policy that 
impacts negatively on the incentives to produce maize would lead to a reduction in 
rural incomes, affecting both peasant farmers and agricultural labour. An export 
price for maize that is not competitive means that the earnings of the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB) will be declining, leading to a deficit. To cover the deficit, 
government will either increase the subsidy to the GMB (which is becoming 
unsustainable) or reduce the producer price paid to farmers by the GMB. Both 
strategies have serious conclusions for food security. Increasing subsidies to the 
GMB will lead to an increase in the budget deficit, thus leading to inflationary 
tendencies. Reducing the producer price will kill the incentives for maize 
production. Clearly then, the GMB requires a competitive export price to remain 
viable.
Thus, these results explain Table 4 and Figure 1. When the Z$ became seriously 
overvalued by 1981, the relative price of tradeables started to decline, but after the 
devaluation in December 1982, and with some lag, it began to improve.
A  POLICY PACKAGE FOR ZIMBABWE?
In summary, these results show that trade and exchange rate policies have an adverse 
impact on the sectors producing tradeables. However, since growth appears to be 
foreign exchange constrained, some policy changes in favour of promoting exports 
need to be instituted. Policymakers need to ask a number of questions aboiit the 
exchange rate, because it is a major component of the structural adjustment 
programme. The following questions should be asked:
o Does Zimbabwe need to reform its exchange rate? What form should this take?
o In a strategy to adjust the exchange rate, what accompanying reforms are 
necessary in the area of fiscal policy?
o What reforms need to be made in the present system of foreign exchange 
allocation?
o What policies should be introduced to protect the vulnerable groups that will 
suffer due to exchange rate adjustment?
In Zimbabwe, there appears to be a connection between fiscal reform, exchange 
rate adjustment, and the foreign exchange allocation system. However, since the 
exchange rate is central to structural adjustment, we will only discuss here the 
different options open to Zimbabwe in this area.
In Zimbabwe, the debate on exchange rate adjustment has acquired an ideological 
flavour, with those in favour of exchange rate adjustment seen as belonging to the 
right wing camp. This is regrettable, since exchange rate adjustment is an instrument 
designed largely to improve the competitiveness of a country. As such, it works in
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the same way as a subsidy or commercial policy. The advantage of exchange rate 
adjustment is that it is less powerful than adjustments in other relative prices (e.g., 
wage adjustments).
Exchange rate adjustment would improve the competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector because it would force farmers to employ more of the cheaper factor of 
production, labour. Under the existing system, where there appears to be some 
currency overvaluation, labour is artificially expensive relative to say capital. 
However, because of foreign exchange constraints, farmers are forced to utilize the 
artificially expensive labour. Once the exchange rate is adjusted, labour will become 
relatively cheaper, as a result, agricultural exports would become more competitive 
and it is possible to envisage employment in the sector increasing.
In the area of exchange rate adjustment, Zimbabwe has probably two options, 
either to institute discrete devaluation or adopt a crawling peg. It seems unlikely 
that Zimbabwe could accept a floating system, even temporarily, because such a 
system would result in greater volatility in the economy. Moreover, a float is 
inimical to Zimbabwe’s professed policy stance, that of control and intervention in 
the economy. For Zimbabwe, the crawling peg system appears attractive since it 
would allow for automatic exchange rate adjustments once a particular, like amount 
of foreign exchange reserves changes. Moreover, because adjustments are automatic, 
exchange rate charges need no longer directly excite political emotions.
However, it should be emphasized that exchange rate adjustment will be successful 
and less painful only if fiscal policy reform is already in place.
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